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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Unternehmen sind Nachfrageänderungen ausgesetzt. Daraus resultieren Beschäftigungsanpas-
sungen. Diese können innerhalb des Unternehmens erfolgen. Zwei prominente Möglichkeiten 
stellen die Ausweitung oder Reduktion der Arbeitszeit, insbesondere der Überstunden und 
eine Modifikation im Beförderungsverhalten dar. Neben diesen Anpassungen auf dem inter-
nen Arbeitsmarkt lassen sich vor allem Veränderungen bei der Beschäftigtenzahl vornehmen. 
Hiervon ist der externe Arbeitsmarkt betroffen. Zwei bisher empirisch kaum untersuchte Fra-
gen sind, ob es einerseits einen Zusammenhang zwischen den Instrumenten der internen An-
passung gibt und welche Verbindungen andererseits zu den externen Anpassungen bestehen, 
ob die Prozesse komplementär oder substitutiv verlaufen. Zudem ist von Bedeutung herauszu-
finden, ob sich im Zeitablauf eine klare Tendenz herauskristallisieren lässt und wie die An-
passungen im Zyklus verlaufen. Anliegen des Beitrages ist, diesen Fragen empirisch nachzu-
gehen.  
 
Für die Studie steht ein umfangreicher Datensatz eines großen deutschen Unternehmens des 
Verarbeitenden Gewerbes, das innovative Produkte auf dem heimischen und ausländischen 
Markt anbietet, für den Zeitraum 1999 bis 2005 zur Verfügung. Auch wenn wegen des Ein-
zelfallcharakters Verallgemeinerungen der Ergebnisse nur sehr beschränkt möglich sind, wei-
sen die verfügbaren Informationen, die direkt aus den Unternehmensunterlagen entstammen, 
verschiedene Vorteile gegenüber anderen Datensätzen auf. Erstens ist der Verlässlichkeits-
grad der Daten sehr hoch. Zweitens bestehen keine Probleme hinsichtlich unbeobachteter He-
terogenität, soweit es Unternehmens-, Wirtschaftsbereich- und Regionalmerkmale betrifft. 
Drittens liegen detaillierte Angaben über die Art der Beschäftigungsanpassung sowie über 
monetäre Anreizinstrumente vor. Und viertens sind die Angaben monatlich. 
 
Die empirische Analyse liefert zunächst deskriptive Ergebnisse. Daraus wird deutlich, dass 
der Beschäftigungszyklus des Unternehmens zwar weitgehend, aber nicht vollständig mit den 
volkswirtschaftlichen Bewegungen übereinstimmt, dass interne und externe Anpassungen 
eher komplementär als substitutiv verlaufen, dass sich kaum analoge Lohnanpassungen aus-
machen lassen, dass von 2002 auf 2003 ein deutlicher Einschnitt bei der Beschäftigtenzahl 
eingetreten ist. Die ökonometrische Untersuchung stützt sich auf einen zweistufigen Ansatz, 
bei dem zunächst mit Hilfe eines bivariaten Probitmodells der Zusammenhang zwischen 
Überstunden und Beförderung herausgearbeitet wird. Hierbei zeigt sich – nicht unbedingt 
erwartet -, dass unbeobachtete Determinanten diese beiden Anpassungsinstrumente in entge-
gen gesetzter Richtung beeinflussen, dass eine abnehmende Tendenz interner Beschäftigungs-
änderungen besteht und sich keine ausgeprägten zyklischen Effekte ausmachen lassen. Die 
sich anschließende Bestimmung des Einflusses von Überstunden- und Beförderungsänderun-
gen auf die Beschäftigtenzahl erfolgt einerseits unabhängig von der Art der Anpassung. Ande-
rerseits wird zwischen Kündigungen, Entlassungen, Auflösungsverträgen und Wechsel in eine 
Transfergesellschaft unterschieden. Im ersteren Fall zeigt sich, dass Beförderungen die Mobi-
litätsneigung reduzieren, während Überstunden das Gegenteil bewirken. Dieses Grundmuster 
bleibt im Wesentlichen bestehen, wenn nach der Art der Beschäftigungstrennung differenziert 
wird. Nur bei den Kündigungen ergeben sich die umgekehrten Effekte und bei den Auflö-
sungsverträgen lassen sich keine Wirkungen von Beförderungen aufdecken.    
 
Non-Technical Summary 
 
Firms are affected by the product demand. This leads to employment adjustments. On the 
internal labour market there exist two prominent possibilities, changes of working hours, 
especially overtime, and modifications of promotion measures. On the external labour market 
the number of employees can be adjusted. In the literature we find only very few 
contributions investigating the issue whether internal adjustments are linked and which 
relationships exist with external adjustments. Are they of a complementary or substitutive 
nature? Furthermore it is of interest to find out, whether we can observe an obvious trend and 
whether the adjustments are driven by cyclical movements. 
 
For this study we have an extensive data set of a large German manufacturing company, 
which supplies innovative products for the domestic and international market, provided on a 
monthly base from January 1999 to December 2005. Although this type of data allows only 
restricted generalisations of the results, the available information has several advantages 
compared with other data sets: (1) The data are very reliable because they are directly 
extracted from the human resources management of the company; (2) there do not exist 
problems with unobserved heterogeneity due to firms, branch or regional characteristics; (3) 
they allow to distinguish between several types of external employment adjustment and we 
can use information on monetary incentive instruments; (4) monthly,  not only yearly data are 
provided. 
 
The empirical analysis starts with descriptive statistics. We find that the employment 
adjustment cycle coincides only to a certain degree with the macroeconomic cycle. Internal 
and external adjustments are more characterized by complementarity than by substitution. 
Over the observed period we cannot detect analogous wage adjustments. It is noticeable that 
in 2003 compared with the years before the number of employees is substantially reduced. 
The econometric investigation is based on a two-stage approach. We start with a bivariate 
probit estimation in order to extract the relationship between the probability of overtime and 
of promotion. Unobserved variables have opposite effects on the former and the latter 
adjustment instrument. Furthermore, we detect a negative trend of internal employment 
adjustments. Cyclical effects are ambiguous. The next step, the determination of external 
adjustments with respect to overtime and promotion adjustments, is split into two estimates. 
On the one hand we do not distinguish between the type of external employment adjustment 
and on the other hand we use this information separating between quits, layoffs, workers with 
a cancellation agreement and with a transition into a transfer organisation. The first appoach 
demonstrates that a promotion reduces the probability to leave the firm while overtime is 
positively associated with an external job change. This pattern holds generally speaking in the 
second, more detailed estimates. Quits are the exception. In this case we observe opposite 
effects. Finally, we cannot detect any influences of promotions on cancellation agreements.          
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         1.  Introduction 
 
This study contributes to the growing literature on internal labour markets that is 
based on personnel records (Baker/Holmstrom 1995, Grund 2002, Lin 2005, 
Pfeifer 2008). This literature, which is summarized by Lin (2005), shows that the 
internal and external labour markets communicate at all hierarchical levels, hence 
there is not much evidence of ports of exit and entry. Further it demonstrates that 
stable hierarchies with career ladder exist and promotions are significant for wage 
growth. In addition, wage variations are large within job levels and the internal 
labour markets are to a certain extent shielded from external market forces in the 
sense that market forces exert an impact on wages at the time of entry (cohort 
effects), but this effect is much weaker inside the company. 
 
The relationship between internal labour market flexibility and the types as well 
as the degree of external adjustments, however, has received less attention in the 
literature. It is this imbalance that we want to redress. In a first step, we examine 
the individual or company induced determinants of internal flexibility such as 
promotions and overtime work and the extent to which they are positively or 
negatively interrelated. Secondly, we address the issue whether and to which 
extent internal flexibility exerts an impact on external adjustments. Are internal 
and external mobility substitutes or complements? Thirdly, we distinguish 
between various types of external mobility, namely quits, dismissals, cancellation 
agreements and transitions to a transfer organisation and examine whether 
differences in the relationship between internal adjustments and the types of 
external mobility can be detected. Finally, we investigate the impact of cyclical 
effects on internal and external mobility during the period covered by our data 
(1999 – 2005). 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the theoretical 
background and the related literature. In Section 3 the company and the data are 
described and the advantages and shortcomings of using data from personnel 
records are discussed. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and Section 5 
contains the methods and results of the econometric investigation. Section 6 
summarizes the basic results.  
 
   2. Background and related literature 
 
The traditional market coordination which implies that quantities adapt to price 
changes and vice versa is only in part applicable to basic dimensions of external 
labour markets such as employment and wages. Nominal wages tend to be rigid 
downwards which leads to real wage rigidity at low inflation rates (Franz/Pfeiffer 
2003, Knoppik/Beissinger 2003, Cornelißen/Hübler 2008). Wage rigidities can 
increase workers’ utility by insuring them against income losses and might keep 
companies profitable if alternative measures of adjustment such as layoffs are less 
costly.  
 
Wage rigidities in conjunction with a substantial level of employment stability 
and opportunities for occupational careers constitute significant elements of 
internal labour markets which shield incumbents from negative shocks in external 
labour markets. For internal labour markets administrative rules and procedures as 
well as custom are important ingredients (Doeringer/Piore 1971, Schlicht 1998) 
 3 
and these markets interact with external labour markets through specific ports of 
entry and exit. The observations of Doeringer and Piore (1971) inspired a broad 
scope of economic theories to explain the functioning of internal labour markets 
ranging from specific human capital, principal-agent, learning and matching 
theories to tournament theories (see Cahuc/Zylberberg 2001, chapter 6 for an 
excellent summary). All in all, until recently internal labour markets were 
interpreted as entities which strengthen and intensify the adjustment deficits of 
external labour markets. This conventional perspective, however, was challenged 
by Gibbs and Hendricks (2004). The authors show with the personnel records of a 
large U.S. corporation that a strictly administered salary system is capable to 
mirror the wage fluctuations emanating from the external labour market and at the 
same time the corporation can retain the efficiency enhancing ingredients (like 
reduction of transaction costs, stimulation of motivation, lowering of turnover and 
facilitating the accumulation of specific human capital) on its internal labour 
market. 
 
Generally, there is a broad consensus that especially firms with internal labour 
markets prefer layoffs to wage cuts in periods of a slack demand (Bewley 2005). 
Layoffs are less detrimental than pay cuts to employees’ morale, layoffs affect 
morale only temporarily, whereas the damage to morale of pay cuts endures. 
Layoffs tend to enhance productivity which is negatively affected by wage 
reductions. To some extent management can control which workers are laid off, 
thus avoiding that employees which the firm wants to retain leave when wages are 
reduced. In addition, layoffs diminish the substantial fixed costs of employment, 
whereas pay cuts save only the variable portion of compensation.   
 
Firms with internal labour markets offering employment stability, however, also 
have to react to negative demand shocks. They can try to honour their 
employment commitment by internal adjustments. Variations of working times 
such as reduced overtime, extended part-time work and delayed promotions are 
measures to stabilize employment and to cut wage costs. In addition, contingent 
labour can be employed which is easy to dismiss in periods of slack demand. As 
an alternative firms can adjust to negative demand shocks by dismissing workers.  
 
The amount of research relating internal labour market mobility to external 
employment adjustments is very limited (Cappelli/Neumark 2004). The 
fundamental issue is whether the kind of flexibility such as employment stability 
in conjunction with promotions, overtime, further training, team work and work 
reorganisation that can be attained through internal labour markets is a substitute 
or a complement to external labour market flexibility. On the one hand,  with a 
given level of employment stability policies and practices which strengthen the 
internal market, for example, by variations of overtime work and adapting 
promotions to cyclical conditions as well as by training employees for new tasks 
might covary with a smaller amount of external labour adjustments. On the other 
hand, companies confronted with the need of strong and frequent employment 
adjustments may implement policies and practices that combine internal and 
external flexibility. “Simple arguments about diminishing returns suggest that it 
may be more effective to put one’s efforts into multiple mechanisms to achieve a 
given result than into only one” (Cappeli/Neumark 2004: 153). Interestingly, the 
authors find that in manufacturing substitution prevails, i.e. team-work and 
various measures of work restructuring are negatively correlated with involuntary 
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and voluntary turnover. Non-manufacturing, however, is characterised by a 
complementarity of internal and external flexibility. This result is basically 
attributed to the impediment of keeping inventories and to the stronger variations 
in peak demand requiring adjustments in the pace and quantity of work in the 
service sector. 
 
 Turning now to the institutional conditions in Germany we distinguish between 
two cases: Layoffs that take into account the dismissal protection law 
(Kündigungsschutzgesetz) and layoffs in conjunction with cost reduction that are 
in addition based on a consensus between the incumbents and management. In the 
second case either a company-level pact for employment is negotiated or a 
transfer organisation (Transfergesellschaft) is established.   In both cases the 
company’s works council is involved, albeit its participation is stronger in the 
second case as the works council acts as a partner of management in elaborating 
and implementing the consensus. 
 
In the first case the firm has to adhere to the social selection criteria stipulated by 
the dismissal protection law. These comprise tenure, age, obligations to pay 
alimony and the status of severe disablement. However, incumbents whose 
employment is of vital importance for the firm are exempt from these criteria. 
Further the law requires redundancy payments, i.e. 50 percent of the monthly 
income for each year of tenure. Frequently, works councils negotiate more 
generous severance payments. In addition, workers who consider quitting because 
they plan to retire or to search a new job can negotiate lucrative cancellation 
agreements (Auflösungsverträge) of their employment contracts. This type of 
separation verges on normal quits which, however, are less frequent in periods of 
slack demand. All in all, these employment protection measures pursue the goals 
to preserve employment by increasing the cost of layoffs and reducing risks of 
employment and pay to wage-earners. The measures might attain these goals, 
although at the cost of a lower rate of job creation and by concentrating the 
burden of employment and wage risks on selected groups such as long-term 
unemployed as well as younger and older people (Cahuc/Zylberberg 2006). 
 
As previously mentioned layoffs implemented with the aim of cost reduction can 
be based on company-level pacts for employment or transfer organisations. They 
usually require an agreement between management and the works council. Firms 
tend to use company-level pacts if the aim of cost reduction cannot be achieved 
by individual dismissals because they are too expensive. The pacts encompass 
concessions by management and the workforce and they specify deviations from 
the collective agreement (Tarifvertrag) (Hübler 2005, 2006). A consensus 
between the respective union and employers’ association is normally requested.  
 
A transfer organisation is established as an operational entity in its own right 
(eigenständige betriebsorganisatorische Einheit). Instead of a dismissal employees 
conclude a fixed-term employment contract with the transfer organisation and are 
thus no longer employed by the original firm. The operational entity provides 
counselling, supports job search activities and offers further training for new jobs 
and careers. In addition, the inception of unemployment is delayed while being 
employed by the transfer organisation and the probability of finding a job might 
increase. The benefits for a firm decreasing its level of employment comprise 
planning reliability and legal certainty as the workers switching to the transfer 
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organisation can no longer take legal action against a discharge (Paprotny 2008). 
Additionally, the firm is not restricted by statutory periods of notice and disposes 
of more leeway for selecting the employees it wants to discharge than in the cases 
of layoffs or cancellation agreements. These benefits, however, are costly. 
Although the Federal Labour Agency pays short-term working allowances to 
employees of the transfer organisation (Transferkurzarbeitergeld) the firm 
reducing employment usually has to supplement these payments and to incur the 
costs of qualification and counselling. Given the conditions of employment 
protection in Germany implementing layoffs by establishing transfer 
organisations appears to be in terms of Bewley (2005: 310) a good management 
practice: “ to delay potential layoffs until the employer can make a large number 
all at once, and then to assure those who remain that there will be no more layoffs 
for some time”.  
 
3. Data 
 
The data for this analysis were provided by a large German manufacturing 
company, which supplies innovative products for the domestic and international 
market.  Several interviews with high-ranking employees of the company’s 
personnel administration were helpful for interpreting the data and clarifying 
institutional details. The company, which employs on average about 1500 men 
and women in the period investigated, has a works council and applies an 
industry-wide collective agreement. The data were directly extracted from the 
personnel records of the company’s computer system and provided on a monthly 
basis from January 1999 to December 2005. Our empirical analysis excludes 
apprentices and trainees. 
 
Using the personnel records of a company for the study of employment 
adjustments entails advantages and some shortcomings. First, the information is 
more reliable than data based on voluntary surveys and even most official 
statistical information as they are directly extracted from the human resources 
management of a company (Grund 2002). Second, it is relatively homogeneous 
with respect to the workforce as it covers only one company in a specific sector 
and region. Third, the data set at our disposal provides information on alternative 
measures to adjust employment such as promotions, overtime work, cancellation 
agreements and transitions into a transfer organisation which are usually not 
available in a differentiated form. Fourth, the data set allows to distinguish 
between various monetary measures like monthly gross wages, grants and 
variability of compensation which might be implemented to accompany 
employment adjustments. Finally and importantly, the data contain information 
about exits or separations on a monthly basis. 
 
Concerning the shortcomings it is evident that an investigation with this type of 
data amounts to a case study with restricted opportunities to generalize. 
Comparisons with other companies, sectors or manufacturing industry are not 
feasible. Specifically, our data set is limited in the sense that information about 
further training, reorganisation of work and team work are not available. 
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   4. Descriptive statistics 
 
As previously mentioned, the personnel data of the firm are available on a 
monthly base. A short description of the applied variables, means, standard 
deviations and number of employee-months are presented in Table 1. The total 
number of observations (employee-months) is N=123 896. If the workforce in the 
firm had remained the same as in January 1999 (n_1/1999=1290) in the entire 
period we would have 7 years x 12 months x 1290= 108360 observations. This 
means compared with the actual number of observations or with the number of 
workers in December 2005 (n_12/2005=1402) that the firm expanded, but this 
development was not continuous. The last row of Table 2a shows the number of 
employees in the last month of the year. In 2002 the maximum is reached 
(n_12/2002=1599). 
 
We investigate employment adjustments by three indicators, namely by two 
dummy variables which describe the employment changes on the internal labour 
market (promotion - PROM, overtime work - OT) and one dummy variable 
(external job mobility - EJM) which demonstrates separations from the firm to the 
external labour market. Roughly 0.4% of the workforce left the firm per month 
within the period 1999-2005, while 0.5% was promoted and 8.5% worked 
overtime – see Table 1. Hence we observe internal as well as external mobility. 
However, at this stage we are not able to say anything about the relationship 
between these movements and about the determinants of job mobility. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of the variables are of interest.     
 
In Table 2a-2b the development of the relevant mobility variables is exhibited for 
the period 1999 to 2005. (For a detailed descriptive investigation of entries and 
exits by hierarchical levels see Gerlach/Pfeifer 2006.) All in all, the numbers 
show that the firm is characterized by two phases. First, from 1999 to 2002 
employment expands as indicated by the December figures. Subsequently, the 
number of employees decreases again, but the final level is higher than the 
starting value. Less workers leave the firm and more enter from 1999 to 2002 than 
in the subsequent years. Nevertheless tenure does not change systematically. In 
2003 and 2005 we observe a difficult economic situation in the firm. This 
contrasts partially with the business cycle in Germany with the highest 
unemployment rate in 1999 and 2005, but not in 2003.  Overtime working and 
promotions are less frequent in 2003 to 2005 than in the previous years. 
Apparently, internal and external labour mobility move in parallel. However, the 
standard working hours per month tend to decline from 1999 to 2003 and 
subsequently a minor rise can be observed (not in the Tables). This development 
is not accompanied by reduced wages (WAGE) and falling supplementary grants 
(GRANTS) on average. Only in 2002 the average wage declines. The ratio of 
workers exposed to a negative wage growth (0.9-6.9%) or negative supplementary 
grant growth (1.4-4.6%) remains very low and does not follow a positive trend  
(not in the Tables). Hence there is evidence of wage rigidity. 
 
The figures in Table 2a and 2b are not completely comparable. In Table 2a the 
number of workers is based on the last month of the year. In Table 2b the total 
number of mobility cases per year is displayed but the reason for separation is not 
available for all workers who leave the firm.  The strongest restructuring of the 
firm is observed in 2003 and 2005. Insofar our firm follows the general 
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phenomenon that enterprises concentrate their adjustments on few and limited 
periods. The difference between 2003 and 2005 is that in the former year the 
transfer organisation is intensively used for reducing employment, whereas the 
latter year is characterised by internal job changes. A first step in downsizing is 
followed by the reorganisation of the firm. Noteworthy is the low number of 
dismissals during the entire period (see Table 2b).  
 
Table 2c presents some detailed information for the critical year 2003. It is 
evident that external job mobility (EJM) and overtime working (OT) are not very 
different comparing younger and older employees, whereas the probability of 
promotion is higher for younger workers and, of course, older employees have a 
longer tenure. If we compare men and women the most striking result is the male 
dominance in overtime working. It is noteworthy that workers with a longer 
education have a higher probability to quit and as a consequence a shorter tenure 
than employees with less education. The latter are more involved in overtime 
work. 
 
5. Econometric investigations 
 
5.1. Methods 
 
In the following our econometric results are presented. On the one hand the 
effects of individual characteristics and macroeconomic variables (x1) on the 
internal mobility are determined. On the other hand external mobility, expressed 
by a dummy whether an individual has left the firm (EJM – y3), is estimated. We 
expect that promotion (PROM – y1) and overtime working (OT – y2) are related to 
jointly unobserved influences. As these variables are measured by dummies we 
assume a bivariate probit model 
 
(1)  y1*   =  x1’β1 + u1 
                          y2*   =  x1’β2 + u2 
                          E(u1) =  E(u2) = 0 
                          V(u1) =  V(u2) = 1 
                          Cov(u1,u2)  = ρ , 
 
where y1* and y2* are latent variables. We observe only yk =1 if yk*>0 and yk =0 
if yk*<=0 for k=1;2. The coefficients are estimated by the ML method where the 
covariance matrix is determined with a cluster robust procedure as employee-
months are considered which are correlated within the group of an individual. The 
likelihood function is specified by 
 
(2)                  lnL = 1 1 1 2 1 2
1
ln ( ' , ' , *)
n
i i i i i
i
q x q xβ β ρ
=
Φ
∑
 
                      
1 if 0; q = -1 otherwise where k=1;2.ki ki kiq y= + ≠
 
                      1 2*i i iq qρ ρ= . 
 
In vector x1 the following variables are incorporated: GRANTS, VCOMP, 
TARGET, WAGE, WAGE², AGE, AGE², SCHOOL, WC, TRAIN, WHOURS, 
UR, YEAR (see Table 1). 
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The next step is to estimate external job mobility (EJM – y3). Again a probit 
model is used and the covariance matrix is determined with a cluster robust 
procedure. As robustness check the random effects panel estimator is added. As 
we want to analyse whether internal mobility has an impact on EJM we 
incorporate the internal mobility variables and control for macroeconomic 
variables and individual characteristics (x3). Interdependencies are likely. 
Therefore, PROM and OT are substituted by the estimates of y1* and y2* 
( 1 2ˆ ˆ,y ePROM y eOT= = ) following Olsen (1980) and Newey (1999) extended to 
the bivariate probit case 
         
(3)  3 1 1 2 2 3 3 3ˆ ˆ* 'y y y x uα α β= + + + .    
 
The vector x3 contains the variables: GRANTS, VCOMP, WAGE, TEN9905, 
WHOURS, SCHOOL, SEX, KIDS, UR and YEAR (see Table 1). Finally, the 
EJM variable is split in accordance with the reason to leave the firm (REASON). 
Four reasons are distinguished, namely quits (y31), layoffs (y32), cancellation 
agreements (y33) and entry into a transfer organisation (y34). Subsequently, a 
multinomial probit model is estimated by the Gaussian quadrature procedure. The 
multidimensional integral is reduced to one dimension. Workers with other 
reasons of job changes (end of fixed-term contract, dismissal without notice, 
internal job change, retirement, death) are not considered in the multinomial 
probit estimation. The probability that individual i choose alternative k is 
 
(4) P( v i1j <=0, …, v i,J-1,j<=0), 
 
where the alternatives (reasons to leave the firm) are 1,2, …,j,…J and  
 
' ' 3 ' ' 3 ' ''( ) ( ) : 'ijj ij ij i j j ij ij i jj ijjv x xη η γ γ ε ε γ ε= − = − + − = + , 
      
where the alternatives j and j’ are compared. The multinomial logit approach is 
not used because it is difficult to explain that the internal job mobility is 
determined by a probit model while the external model is based on a logit model. 
Furthermore, the Hausman tests reject the necessary IIA condition of the logit 
model. The 2χ - test statistics of the same specification as in Table 5 demonstrate 
this for the logit model  
2 64.26 ( 0.0005) if reason 1 is eliminatedp valueχ = − = ; 
         
2 52.26 ( 0.0005) if reason 2 is eliminatedp valueχ = − = ; 
2 36.69 ( 0.0470) if reason 3 is eliminatedp valueχ = − = ; 
2 214.47 ( 0.0000) if reason 4 is eliminatedp valueχ = − = . 
 
An open question is whether individuals react instantaneously or lagged on 
internal labour market changes with external adjustments. From our view both 
possibilities should be considered and therefore we extend the static model by 
lagged influences. 
 
An alternative to our two-stage approach might be a trivariate probit model where 
promotion, overtime and separation are jointly related to unobserved individual 
influences. Though we have checked this idea our investigation concentrates on 
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the stepwise procedure. We argue that employees do not decide jointly on internal 
and external adjustments. The determinants are not identical. Internal adjustments 
have priority for the workers whereas external mobility is a second order problem. 
One of our main objectives in this paper is to analyse explicitly the influence of 
internal on external adjustments. We want to ascertain whether these two types of 
adjustment are complements or substitutes. A trivariate probit model seems to us 
less adequate for this issue. Furthermore, it is difficult to incorporate dynamic 
processes and the various types of external mobility in this model. The application 
of the trivariate approach has shown that the incorporation of lagged overtime 
working and promotion effects does not perform well. The estimates which use 
the GHK simulator cannot evaluate the likelihood function.  
 
5.2. Results 
 
The bivariate probit estimates in Table 3 show the relationship between 
promotion and overtime work, our two indicators of internal mobility. A priori it 
is ambiguous whether the link is positive or negative.  The firm might promote 
the most productive workers and the employees who are strongly involved in 
overtime work.  However, for our firm we observe the opposite with a negative 
and significant correlation (rho = -0.09). The reason might be that the requested 
abilities for promotion and overtime work differ. The former should encompass 
characteristics such as decisiveness and tenacity in negotiations, willingness to 
accept responsibility as well as less risk-aversion. Overtime work, however, is 
more important for less educated workers.1 Due to employment protection firms 
are reluctant to hire employees if product demand increases temporarily.  The 
alternative is overtime work.  The estimates confirm this hypothesis. In the OT 
function the coefficient of the regressor SCHOOL is negatively significant. The 
opposite is expected in the PROM equation. However, we find an insignificant 
influence. Altogether the PROM equation is suboptimal compared with the OT 
equation. Only few effects are significant. A nonlinear wage influence is detected. 
Initially, the probability rises with wage and roughly at a monthly wage of €4000 
the probability decreases again. Furthermore, a white collar worker has better 
chances to be promoted. A striking result is the negative trend in the promotion 
and in the overtime function. Both indicators of internal mobility are less 
important in the end than in the beginning of the considered period. Evidently,   
the relevance of the internal labour market has declined. Cyclical effects 
expressed by the unemployment rate (UR) cannot be detected. It should be 
stressed that wage has also a nonlinear influence of second order on OT. This 
could contradict the hypothesis of especially less educated employees performing 
                                               
1
 We have tested whether the negative correlation between overtime and promotion vanishes when 
lagged overtime is incorporated. The hypothesis is that a prior commitment to work overtime 
increases the probability to be promoted. However, the estimates of this approach do not confirm 
this conjecture, promotion and lagged overtime are negatively correlated in our data set, too – not 
in the Tables. A further reason of the negative correlation might be a data problem, namely that 
overtime is not always correctly recorded. With a higher position of an individual within the 
firm’s hierarchy the probability that overtime is unpaid and that these hours are not documented 
might increase. One can also suppose that overtime for white collar workers who receive a fixed 
monthly salary is not correctly recorded. And finally, incomplete recording is likely if the firm has 
introduced a working hours account (Arbeitszeitkonto). We cannot test these suppositions, 
however, the management of our firm has declared that they have recorded all hours of overtime 
working because the works council requires this information. 
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overtime work. However, the coefficients of SCHOOL and TRAIN support our 
interpretation.  
 
The next step is the analysis of external mobility. We investigate the determinants 
that an individual separates from the firm (EJM). For this purpose a probit model 
is estimated. The results are presented in Table 4. We are especially interested in 
detecting whether internal mobility has an impact on external mobility when 
interdependencies are taken into account (ePROM, eOT). The result in column (1) 
and also in column (3) where a random effects panel estimator is applied is 
obvious:  Promoted employees (ePROM) are less likely to leave the firm. A priori 
we could expect a similar effect for overtime workers because the performance of 
overtime work indicates that the enterprise has a strong demand for these 
employees. The coefficient of eOT shows the opposite, the relation is positive. In 
this context we should take into account that the workforce can be substituted 
partially by overtime work. The incorporation of a one-year lagged variable 
demonstrates that internal adjustment prior to the separation decision has reverse 
effects. If no further promotions follow we observe a tendency to quit the job, 
whereas working overtime in the past does not favour external mobility. These 
results also hold under neglecting instantaneous effects – not in the Tables. 
Finally, we should stress that lagged influences cannot be detected in panel 
estimates. They are completely insignificant.  
 
 It is noticeable that individual characteristics such as SEX, KIDS and SCHOOL 
have no clear effects on external mobility. Nevertheless the signs of the 
coefficients of KIDS and SCHOOL are in accordance with our expectations. 
Educated workers and workers without children are more mobile. TENURE has 
the expected sign if this variable measures the specific human capital (SHC), the 
influence is insignificant, however. An interpretation is that SHC does not 
increase continuously with tenure. Capital will become obsolete. Thus, medium-
term tenure is probably a better indicator of SHC than entire tenure. Therefore, we 
use the total employee-months in the firm within the period 1999-2005 
(TEN9905) as an alternative measure of SHC. If we substitute TENURE in Table 
4 by TEN9905, we find a negative and highly significant influence (not in the 
Tables).    
 
As internal mobility exhibits a falling trend, an increase of external mobility could 
compensate this development. However, this trend is also negative. This means all 
in all that the firm is characterised by a decreasing labour mobility. In contrast to 
internal mobility the estimates demonstrate a cyclical course of external job 
changes. Higher unemployment rates (UR) reduce the probability to separate from 
the firm. A problem with the results of Table 4 is that it does not distinguish 
between reasons for external job changes. Other investigations have impressively 
demonstrated that the factors influencing quits and layoffs are very different 
(Campbell 1997, Giuliano/Levine/Leonard 2006).  
 
In Table 5 multinomial probit estimates for four reasons of separating from the 
firm are presented in two versions, with and without lagged variables. The 
conventional distinction is between quits and layoffs. Additionally, we distinguish 
between cancellation agreements and entries into a transfer organisation. The 
results display fundamental differences and also some similarities. We find a 
negative trend (YEAR), a cyclical behaviour (UR) and a positive correlation 
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between wages and separation for all four reasons. The internal mobility 
(ePROM, eOT) has significant instantaneous impacts on the layoff risk and the 
risk to pass into the transfer organisation while lagged influences are effective in 
all four cases. The former two causes of separation are comparable as in both 
cases the decision is more strongly determined by the employer, whereas 
employees will finally make the decision to quit or to accept a cancellation 
agreement. As our empirical analysis focuses on individual level, we can only 
implicitly argue that our firm pursue a different adjustment strategy for different 
groups of workers. 
 
An increasing probability of overtime work leads instantaneously to a higher risk 
of a layoff or a switch into the transfer organisation. Although this result is 
mitigated by positive lagged effects we have to ask what’s the logic behind this 
result? Excess work is an indicator that the firm has a strong demand for these 
employees. However, in a crisis with a falling product demand the firm has to 
save costs. Dismissals are one way to reduce costs. The required cost reduction is 
more easily attained if workers with overtime are laid-off than employees with 
standard working hours.  In other words, fewer workers have to be dismissed in 
the former than in the latter case to achieve a constant level of cost reductions. 
This is beneficial for the firm as less negative reactions of the remaining work 
force are expected, and it is cheaper to expand the working hours than to hire new 
employees if product demand is rising again.  
 
Furthermore, firms want to keep their promoted employees. They have invested in 
them and they have tested that their abilities are valuable for the enterprise. The 
quit decision depending on promotion is ambiguous. On the one hand an 
individual might expect a further rise within the hierarchy. On the other hand 
another promotion could be impossible because the hierarchy is too flat and 
therefore the individual quits. Empirics support the latter hypothesis though the 
relation is only significant for delayed effects. 
 
All in all, the multinomial approach is more successful in explaining the 
separations that are primarily determined by the firm than the separations initiated 
by decisions of individual workers.  Individual characteristics such as SCHOOL, 
SEX and KIDS are not very important, although we should emphasize that 
females are more willing to accept a cancellation agreement than males. The 
effect of TEN9905 is negative and highly significant for all four separation 
reasons. If the entire tenure variable (TENURE) is used only a vague impact is 
detected (the results are not presented in the Tables).  Long tenure reduces only 
the quit decision significantly.     
 
6. Summary 
 
This paper investigates internal and external labour mobility of employees. 
Personnel records from one company are used for the period 1999 to 2005. This 
has the advantage that it is not necessary to control for firm specific 
characteristics. The most notable results are: 
 
(i) Promotion and overtime work are negatively correlated via jointly 
unobserved variables. 
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(ii) Internal labour mobility has an impact on external mobility. Promoted 
employees and employees without overtime work are less likely to separate from 
the firm. 
 
(iii) Our approach is more successful in explaining separations that are primarily 
determined by the firm than separations based on decisions by individual 
employees.  
 
(iv) There is a tendency of reduced internal as well as external mobility, whereas 
pro-cyclical effects can only be observed for external employment adjustments. 
Apparently, management concentrates on dismissals in a specific period. 
 
(v) Due to the last result, given the conditions of employment protection in 
Germany, transfer organisations providing counselling, supporting job search and 
offering further training are a policy instrument that helps companies to 
implement and concentrate layoffs. Apart from enhancing labour market 
flexibility transfer organisations play an important role in the process of clustering 
downsizing.  
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Table 1: Variable definitions, number of observations, mean and standard deviation  
 pendix: measured in employee-months of 1999-2005 
  
 
 
Variable - Definition N Mean Std.dev.
    
 AGE - age in years                               123896 42.2023 9.1217
 
 EJM - dummy=1, if external job mobility         123896 0.0041 0.0615
 
 eOT - estimated overtime (see eq. (1)) 105589 -1.6662 1.2646
 
 ePROM     - estimated  PROM (see eq. (1))               105589 -2.6875 0.4253
  
 GRANTS - supplementary grants per year          121425 4866.4020 4223.6010
 
 KIDS - number of children                              123896 0.7055 0.9133
 
 OT - dummy=1, if overtime working                              123896 0.0849 0.2787
 
 PROM  - dummy=1, if promotion last period          123896 0.0051 0.0711
 
 REASON to leave the firm - catecorial               8567 5.4429 3.0274
 variable (0-stayer, 1-quit, 2-layoff, 3-cancel-     
 lation agreement, 4-transfer organisation)        
    
 SEX - dummy=1, if female                        123896 0.2402 0.4272
 
 SCHOOL - dummy =1, if high school                         123896 0.3101 0.4626
 (Abitur) or university degree                    
 
 TARGET - dummy=1, if target agreement           107928 0.0847 0.2784
 
 TENURE - number of years within the firm        123896 14.3271 9.4439
 
 TEN9905 - tenure in months in 1999-2005         123896 74.3377 16.6804
 
 TRAIN - dummy=1, if occupational                      123896 0.6513 0.4766
 training       
 
 VCOMP - dummy=1, if variable                  123896 84.9430 163.7649
 compensation   
 
 UR - unemployment rate in the region            123896 10.9770 0.9806
 (Bundesland) of the firm (in %)             
 
 WAGE - monthly gross wage                        123896 3052.1800 1249.6880
 
 WC - dummy =1, if white collar worker            123896 0.0871 0.2821
 In a high position                          
 
 WHOURS - standard working hours per month        123896 151.2733 15.5982
_________________________________________________________________________ 
    
 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2a: Mobility and earnings indicators measured in December 1999-2005 
        
                
 Mean and standard deviation in parentheses    
        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
        
EJM  0.0051 0.0035 0.0077 0.0050 0.0053 0.0027 0.0036 
 (0.0715) (0.0588) (0.0873) (0.0706) (0.0727) (0.0517) (0.0596) 
        
PROM  0.0198   0.0194   0.0205 0.0231   0.0106   0.0040   0.0000  
 (0.1393) (0.1380) (0.1417) (0.1504) (0.1025) (0.0633) (0.0000) 
        
OT 0.0777 0.1353 0.1108 0.1463 0.0571 0.0563 0.0571 
            (0.2677) (0.3422) (0.3139) (0.3536) (0.2320) (0.2306) (0.2320) 
        
TENURE 14.2088 14.1587 13.7306 14.0244 14.6371 14.7738 15.4967 
            (8.7151) (9.1227) (9.5858) (9.7373) (9.7066) (9.8522) (9.8191) 
        
WAGE 2840.65 2925.58 3007.14 2999.19 3095.71 3220.13 3305.55 
           (1120.87) (1194.02) (1266.29) (1140.06) (1249.20) (1289.50) (1370.47) 
        
GRANTS 4426.73 4333.36 4483.07 4618.61 4773.73  5201.97  5714.36 
           (3516.22) (3493.97) (4296.93) (3186.75) (3937.18) (4461.75) (5983.36) 
        
                
     n       1365 1441 1562 1599 1507 1492 1402 
                
        
Note: Variable definitions see Table 1; n - number of employees.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b: Reasons of separation (1999-2005) 
     
         
Reason of separation  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
QUIT   8   5 '7 16 7 10   
LAYOFF   1  2 2 5 2 
CANCELLATION AGREEMENT 2 1  3 8 5 9 
TRANSFER ORGANISATION     66 3  
END of FIXED-TERM CONTRACT  1 2 3 11 10   17 
INTERNAL JOB CHANGE      2 77 
DISMISSAL without NOTICE     1  1 
RETIREMENT     2 9 4 10 
DEATH     1   2 1 2 1 
Total  10 4 7 19 114 38 127 
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Table 2c: Descriptive  statistics  2003 
     
       
 AGE<=30  AGE>=50  
       
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
EJM 2380 0.0088 0.0935 4843 0.0112 0.1050 
PROM 2380 0.0055 0.0737 4843 0.0012 0.0352 
OT 2380 0.0408 0.1978 4843 0.0493 0.2166 
TENURE 2380 4.0285 2.4830 4843 22.753 9.2276 
       
       
 SEX=1   SEX=0   
       
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
EJM 4547 0.0090 0.0945 14269 0.0056 0.0747 
PROM 4547 0.0035 0.0592 14269 0.0032 0.0567 
OT 4547 0.0172 0.1299 14269 0.0644 0.2455 
TENURE 4547 13.021 9.1501 14269 14.740 9.8863 
       
       
 SCHOOL=1  SCHOOL=0  
       
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
EJM 5867 0.0085 0.0919 12949 0.0055 0.0738 
PROM 5867 0.0041 0.0638 12949 0.0029 0.0541 
OT 5867 0.0249 0.1558 12949 0.0657 0.2478 
TENURE 5867 10.461 8.3898 12949 16.075 9.8065 
       
Note: Variable definitions see Table 1.      
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                         Note: Variable definitions see Table 1. 
Table 3: Bivariate ML probit estimates of promotion and overtime 
     
            Robust    
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
PROM 
     
 
GRANTS/10³ -0.0079 0.0074 -1.07 0.285
VCOMP/10³ 0.0293 0.1107 -0.26 0.792
TARGET 0.3097 0.2163 -1.43 0.152
WAGE 0.0008 0.0001 7.07 0.000
WAGE²/104 -0.0945 0.0156 -6.07 0.000
AGE 0.0103 0.0135 0.77 0.444
AGE2 -0.0004 0.0002 -2.29 0.022
SCHOOL -0.0061 0.0434 -0.14 0.888
WC 0.5284 0.2159 2.45 0.014
TRAIN -0.0262 0.0379 -0.69 0.490
WHOURS -0.0003 0.0017 -0.16 0.873
UR -0.0333 0.0234 -1.42 0.155
YEAR -0.0978 0.0110 -8.89 0.000
Constant 192.6902 21.9709 8.77 0.000
 
OT 
 
 
GRANTS/10³ -0.0516 0.0109 -4.73 0.000
VCOMP/10³ 1.0838 0.1183 9.16 0.000
TARGET 0.5572 0.3029 1.84 0.066
WAGE 0.0018 0.0002 8.39 0.000
WAGE²/104 -0.0024 0.0003 -7.30 0.000
AGE 0.0103 0.0193 0.54 0.592
AGE2 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.58 0.559
SCHOOL -0.4372 0.0834 -5.24 0.000
WC -1.5066 0.3280 -4.59 0.000
TRAIN -0.1718 0.0639 -2.69 0.007
WHOURS 0.0127 0.0031 4.16 0.000
UR 0.0145 0.0134 1.08 0.280
YEAR -0.1016 0.0094 -10.80 0.000
Constant 197.1183 18.8229 10.47 0.000
     
N          105 589   
Wald test        CHI²(26)     694.21     Prob value 0.0000
rho    -0.0862   
Test of rho=0         CHI²(1)      8.465     Prob value 0.0036
_________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4: ML probit estimates of external job mobility 
    
         
  Probit ML  Probit ML              RE Probit ML              RE Probit ML 
         
  Robust  Robust     
 Coef. Std.Err.            Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
         
ePROM -0.6043 0.2634 -1.3114 0.2645 -0.8828 0.4534 -0.9932 0.5503 
eOT 0.2226 0.1028 0.3918 0.1016 0.3484 0.1902 0.3342 0.2198 
ePROM(L12)   1.0443 0.0790   0.4636 0.3382 
eOT(L12)   -0.2487 0.0305   -0.0866 0.1110 
GRANTS/10³ -0.0019 0.0141 0.0009 0.0145 0.0356 0.0167 0.0342 0.0174 
VCOMP 0.1683 0.2379 0.1750 0.2365 0.1883 0.4693 0.2381 0.6151 
WAGE/10³ 0.1963 0.0749 0.1740 0.0767 0.1165 0.1414 0.0340 0.1480 
TENURE -0.0088 0.0059 -0.0085 0.0060 -0.0110 0.0116 -0.0056 0.0121 
WHOURS -0.0076 0.0039 -0.0071 0.0039 -0.0118 0.0070 -0.0070 0.0071 
SCHOOL 0.1822 0.1415 0.1216 0.1430 0.5106 0.2381 0.4713 0.2521 
SEX 0.2119 0.1133 0.1647 0.1121 0.2409 0.2160 0.3124 0.2178 
KIDS -0.0986 0.0565 -0.0946 0.0567 -0.0872 0.1040 -0.0850 0.1076 
UR -0.5688 0.0508 -0.5691 0.0524 0.0378 0.0966 0.0310 0.0997 
YEAR -0.3632 0.0313 -0.4007 0.0328 -0.1921 0.0602 -0.2016 0.0632 
Constant '730.58 62.757 806.38 65.664 373.52 120.02 392.63 126.10 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
         
Note: L12 - Lag of 12 months; other variable definitions see Table 1.    
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Table 5: Multinomial ML probit estimates of external job mobility  
              with respect to reason of separation 
 
  
  Robust  Robust 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
_________________________________________________________ 
QUIT 
    
 
ePROM   0.7571 
  
0.4909 -0.1342 0.5028 
eOT -0.0879 0.1813 0.1848 0.1779 
ePROM(L12)   1.4841 0.2152 
eOT(L12)   -0.4117 0.0593 
GRANTS/10³ 0.0367 0.0215 0.0491 0.0214 
VCOMP -0.1270 0.5534 -0.1569 0.5735 
WAGE 0.0002 0.0002 0.1338 0.2118 
TEN9905 -0.0548 0.0046 -0.0583 0.0049 
WHOURS -0.0034 0.0121 -0.0021 0.0123 
SCHOOL 0.0092 0.3167 -0.1343 0.3381 
SEX 0.4698 0.2810 0.4089 0.2798 
KIDS -0.0204 0.1906 -0.0127 0.1971 
UR -0.7691 0.1280 -0.7772 0.1237 
YEAR -0.4029 0.0734 -0.4673 0.0783 
Constant 816.38 147.15 946.76 156.85 
 
LAYOFF 
    
 
ePROM -1.6488 0.7719 -2.4384 0.7594 
eOT 0.7780 0.3535 0.9988 0.3525 
ePROM(L12)   0.9498 0.2336 
eOT(L12)   -0.2116 0.0709 
GRANTS/10³ 0.0560 0.0233 0.0624 0.0265 
VCOMP -0.9654 0.9692 -1.3611 1.1535 
WAGE 0.0006 0.0003 0.6358 0.2696 
TEN9905 -0.0479 0.0050 -0.0487 0.0052 
WHOURS -0.0396 0.0139 -0.0412 0.0146 
SCHOOL 0.4745 0.4783 0.4706 0.4845 
SEX 0.3457 0.5577 0.3269 0.5762 
KIDS 0.2790 0.1440 0.2606 0.1418 
UR -0.7028 0.1008 -0.6456 0.0972 
YEAR -0.4804 0.0658 -0.5238 0.0631 
Constant 968.77 131.89 1055.71 126.45 
_________________________________________________________ 
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Continuation Table 5 
 
 
CANCELLATION 
   
     
ePROM -0.2501 0.7105 0.9029 0.7029 
eOT 0.4139 0.2285 0.5236 0.2214 
ePROM(L12)   1.0809 0.2088 
eOT(L12)   -0.0358 0.0933 
GRANTS/10³ -0.0327 0.0365 -0.0259 0.0395 
VARCOMP 0.4649 0.6048 0.4194 0.5778 
WAGE 0.0004 0.0002 0.0047 0.0216 
TEN9905 -0.0579 0.0056 -0.0607 0.0061 
WHOURS -0.0008 0.0099 -0.0031 0.0101 
SCHOOL -0.7649 0.4280 -0.8884 0.4419 
SEX 0.8752 0.3111 0.7889 0.3141 
KIDS 0.2461 0.1705 0.2299 0.1755 
UR -0.8491 0.1557 -0.6942 0.1519 
YEAR -0.4371 0.1012 -0.4948 0.1012 
Constant 882.86 202.28 998.25 202.17 
 
TRANSFER 
    
 
ePROM -1.8824 0.3911 -2.6987 0.3875 
eOT 0.8907 0.1461 1.0995 0.1485 
ePROM(L12)   1.1689 0.1609 
eOT(L12)   -0.2771 0.0571 
GRANTS/10³ 0.0293 0.0219 0.0327 0.0211 
VCOMP 1.0014 0.4209 1.1413 0.4145 
WAGE 0.0004 0.0001 0.3940 0.1327 
TEN9905 -0.0683 0.0039 -0.0709 0.0042 
WHOURS -0.0320 0.0062 -0.0329 0.0063 
SCHOOL -0.0857 0.2754 -0.1729 0.2757 
SEX 0.2923 0.2153 0.2464 0.2134 
KIDS 0.0473 0.1010 0.0665 0.1033 
UR -1.5415 0.1404 -1.4376 0.1544 
YEAR -0.8397 0.0748 -0.9053 0.0822 
Constant 1698.25 150.83 1829.63 165.42 
 
N 104 150  88 233  
CHI²(48) 612.29 CHI²(56) 676.87  
Prob value 0.000  0.000  
_________________________________________________________ 
     
Note: L12 - Lag of 12 months; other variable definitions see Table 1. 
 
